COAL, MAFIA AND MINERS

India is the third largest producer of coal in the world after China and Russia. At the time of independence the country produced 30 million tones (mt) mainly in the private sector. On the eve of Coal Nationalisation in 1972-73 the production was 72 mt. Today it produces 345 mt of coal out of which 30 mt is cooking coal [Standard Committee on Energy, 2001].

The principal user of coal is power sector which consumes around 200 mt and is responsible for 63% of power generation in the country. Cement is the other major user, consuming 17 mt. Coking coal is mainly used in the iron & steel industry.

India has a coal reserve of over 200 billion tones which at the present rate will last more than 200 years. Indian coal is relatively poor in calorific value and has high ash content. However it has low sulphur content.

Coal is arguably the most polluting fuel [Martin, 2002]. Historically coal is on its way out. World coal production reached its peak in 1997 and since then it has fallen by 7%. Coal is being replaced by oil which in turn is being replaced by natural gas [Brown, 2002]. However, India is likely to continue to produce and use it because coal is still the cheapest fuel available. Otherwise the import bill of oil and gas will go up. As for hydro electricity and nuclear power plant are concerned, there is large number of unresolved issues. Their share is not likely to go up significantly [Das, 2002].

Production of coal today is mainly in the public sector except for a few captive mines. It is organized under Coal India Ltd (CIL) which has 500 working mines in 7 subsidary producing companies spread over W. Bengal, Jharkhand, MP, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Orissa. Singareni Collieries Co Ltd is jointly owned by A. P. Govt. and Govt. of India.

While CIL as a whole is a profit making company, three of its Eastern Indian subsidiaries – ECL, BCCL and CCL have been making high losses.

Bharat Coking Coal Ltd (BCCL) was formed on 17.10.1971. It produces coking coal to be used mainly in iron & steel industry. There are 81 working mines in Jharia-Dhanbad area. It has been producing around 30 mt. There is a reserve of 17 billion tones in the area out of which 4.6 bt is prime coking coal and 5.6 bt is medium coking coal [Roy, 2002a]. However, the production is going down. In 1999-2000 it was 27.90 mt. The production has high ash content which is reduced in coal washeries. These are also working only at about 45% capacity. To meet the stipulated 17% ash content the industry is importing coking coal to the tune of 12 mt and blends it with local coal to obtain stipulated quality [Das, 2002].

As said above the industry is in crisis. Production is falling, work force is falling, there is no new recruitment and there are high losses. The losses increased from 140 crore (1997-98) to 1277 crore in 2000-01, that is Rs 3.5 crore per day! Some 19 mines have been closed and there is fire below Jharia Township that is difficult to douse and prime coking coal is turning to ashes! So while theoretically coal and coking coal has a good demand in India, coal industry and particularly coking coal industry is sick and faces insurmountable difficulties in coming out of it. How has this situation come about? What is the role of different stake holders – that is government management, workers and unions and bystander population?

Jharia Coalfield

Coal mining in this area started at the end of the 19^th century under the British Raj by British Coal companies. Over the years and particularly on the eve of independence it changed hand and came to be owned by Indian business community. It produces mainly coking coal and it is one of the biggest and oldest coalfields in India. It is also, due to its long history, the most labour intensive coal mine. The mines are located in what was Santhal Country in Chotta Nagpur Plateau. The rural hinterland still has significant Santhal population and many mine workers have been and are Santhalis. The area has seen significant Jharkhand movement in the 70s under the leadership of Shibu Soren. The miners’ struggle also had hinterland support and the struggle carried the overtones of the Great Santhal rebellion in the form of bows and arrows carried by some of the miners!

The Situation in the 60s

Coal mining under the private Indian ownership had by this time become predominantly slaughter mining. That is they paid no heed to safety, future of the mine and carried out unscientific mining with an attitude to make as much profit as you can make now. The owners had no capital to invest, did not pay minimum wages and the musclemen originally brought from the ABC (Arrah, Balia and Chhapra) districts of Bihar to control the workers in the 40s had become powerful Mafia type contractors in the late 60s.

Nationalisation

The demand primarily came from the non-coal big industry such as iron and steel and power and not from the coal industry. The demand itself has a long history starting from 1920 with the Coal Field Committee. It was the 1936 Coal Mining Committee which for the first time mooted the idea of state ownership. However, due to the hold of private owners, govt. dragged its feet although committee after committee (1945 Coalfield Committee, 1951 Working Party for Coal Industry, 1954-55 Estimate Committee for Lok Sabha, 1955 Balwant Rai Mehta Committee) pointed out about safety of workers, avoidable waste, increase in production through a well considered plan, ruthless and haphazard exploitation of national wealth and so on. It was however the inability of private sector to bring capital that made it imperative to nationalize coal with Kumara Mangalam’s dream “takeover of entire coal mining industry, marks the end of an era of unhealthy and unscientific mining along with exploitation of labour and other malpractices. It represents the beginning of a new period of management of the coal mines in the over all interest of the nation.” [Roy, 2002] But this dream did not come true though over all production, productivity (output per mine shift, 0.58 to 1.9 t) and employment have definitely gone up. Most of the production has been in open cast mines, (19.8 mt to 225 mt), the increase in the underground sector being (58.4 mt to 74 mt) although enormous money was spent in coal mechanization [Das, 2002].

The Emergence of BCKU

As has been said above the Mafia had come into being. It was dominated by upper caste male outsiders from ABC (Arrah-Balia-Chhapra) districts of Bihar and Azamgarh district of UP. A situation of a very humiliating kind of exploitation against lower caste, tribal and women existed. This chaos led to the workers to the workers movement against the mafia under the banner of BCKU. This became more acute after nationalization because the ABC Mafia became stronger.  Thousands of telegrams were sent by Mafia to their cousins in ABC districts on the eve of the coal nationalization inviting them to heap the harvest in time.

Although the Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (BCKU) has always been affiliated to CITU, from 1969 onwards it worked as an independent union. Politically too, its leader, A K Roy was thrown out of CPI(M) due to the fact that he published an article in Frontier stating that the question raised by the naxalites are valid and deserve a debate and response.

BCKU developed its own political front called Marxist Coordination Committee and allied with the regional movement for the Jharkhand. Specifically it allied with Shibu Soren who, under the banner of Jharkhand Mukthi Morcha, raised the land question. The other ally was Vinod Bihari Mahato, leader of the non-tribal local people of Jharkhand. The front was a major intervention in the existing political praxis.  It raised the slogan of Lalkhand (Red Region). A K Roy won the 1977 Lok Sabha election from jail!

At the trade union level it contributed to the agenda, form and style of the movement and hinterland support. It became a mass-based militant movement and won wide scale recognition in the progressive movement in the country.

In this context the main slogans of BCKU were (i) Goonda Bhagao (Throw out the muscle men) and (ii) Regularisation of Employment.

The first was aimed at getting rid of goondas from the coal mines. Goondas meant Mafia, musclemen, contractors and moneylenders. Regularisation of employment meant jobs for local people and workers who were already working in the mines as contract labour. Except for a handful of skilled and unskilled workers, none of the local people were permanent employees. On the other hand hand, some 50,000 out of a total workforce of 2 lakh were inducted from outside who had never seen a mine. This was the result of the telegrams mentioned above. Many mines destroyed the evidence of contract labour and the mafia burnt the records to induct their own people. People who worked for years in the mines found no trace of their records. Managers were forced to put these new people to work who had never seen a mine face.

As a result of the workers’ struggle led by BCKU some 20,000 contract labourers were absorbed as permanent labour in the decade of the 70s. While this was a major victory, they could do nothing about those illegal 50,000 recruitment. Nor could BCCL throw them out because these people were well connected politically and economically. And they had the good jobs – overman, labour sardar and supervisors. Under the pressure of unions however some contract labourers also got some office jobs and munshi jobs. On the whole however there is a surplus labour in every category except mine loaders. This is one of the major contributing causes of the crisis of BCCL.

The Mafia got firmly in place of power within the BCCL management and in the coal field as contractors. They were no longer interested in squeezing the workers. They moved to greener pastures, that of, looting the mines and government. coffers. Every kind of corruption was taking place. And of course this led to inter Mafia warfare or gang warfare. The Dhanbad-Jharia coal field got completely dominated by the Mafia.

During this period although the union had become strong there were no major issues of struggle left. Workers were interested in wages, bonus and covertly tried to get part of the loot. The trade union was left with day to day grievances of the workers.

Mechanisation

By the 80s coal mechanization became a new mantra with the coal bureaucracy and the government. Massive international loans were taken to import mine machinery from Austrialia, Poland, UK and USA. Many of these machines were never utilized and many broke down due to inadequate repair facility and non-availability of spare parts. Not much attempts were made to develop indigenous technology and MAMC of Durgapur has no work. A dragline of Rs 50 crore is standing idle in Block II of BCCL in absence of large virgin area to utilize its capacity. In Amlabad colliery of BCCL two sets of long wall machines are lying idle costing crores of rupees because this technology does not suit our mines [Roy, 2002]. On the whole there is a yawning gap between the liberal norms fixed by CMPDIL for the utilization of equipment and their actual utilization [Standing Committee on Energy, 2002]. By the 90s the idea of coal mechanization was dropped. While there are lot of ideas such as semi-mechanisation, but meanwhile BCCL has become a sick unit of CIL.

BCKU was from the beginning opposed to mechanization and VRS but could not organize large scale opposition.

The sickness of the coal mining industry in the Dhanbad-Jharia sector is thus a combination of many factors. The number one factor is mismanagement and corruption of the top officials of the company. The theft and loot at BCCL is estimated to be of the order of Rs 100 crore, which is roughly same as its annual loss [Roy, 2002 a]. None of the Govt reports, BIFR, reports of CIL etc. mention this but talk of problems that actually arise from this. These are:

1.         Surplus in all categories except in mine loaders category.  50,000 or 25% of the employees are surplus, most of them drawing higher salaries. Again it is these people who are indulging in corruption and looting. Their number also kept on increasing till the 90s.

For CIL as a whole, since 1971, the number of officers has gone up fourfold, monthly and time rated workers have doubled, but the number of mine loaders has decreased. In BCCL there are 19720 mine loaders out of which on an average 10278 are present. The other categories taken together are 93097 out of which 75995 are normally present. Thus the ratio of direct and indirect workers is 1:7 whereas it should never be greater than 1:2 [Roy, 2002a].

2.         Wrong kind of mechanization involving locked up crores of rupees of investment. On the other hand basic production tools like picks and shovels, boots, helmet with torch and battery are not available or in short supply. This contributes to fall in production and a vicious circle emerges.

In this sort of scenario the workers are mainly interested in keeping their jobs. Their sons and daughters will not get jobs. The management cannot retrench any one. There are no new recruitments. Workers are suffering from heart problems, TB, Black Lung (coal worker’s pneumonoconiasis), blood pressure and so on. Alcoholism is on the rise and many are dying due to alcoholism and for consuming illicit liquor. Although workers have high salaries, there are not enough schools or hospitals. Jharia town is declared unfit for human habitation. The railways have stopped using one main line and two others are also dangerous and trains run at 10 kmph.

There are four stake holders involved and each has a sort of solution which is difficult to realize. They are the government, the private sector, the workers and the bystander population.

The first is the government management side. Their position is that unless the BCCL annual production goes up to 37 mt it is impossible to save the company. This is possible only if it can take out coking coal under Jharia town which is under fire. At present this valuable coal is reduced to ashes. So the only way to take it out is by open cast mining. This however means displacing the whole Population of the Jharia town, acquiring land, giving compensation and so on. Jharia is one of the largest markets in Eastern India. No one has that kind of money to give compensation, nor is any one in Jharia prepared to leave [Mukherjee, 2002].

The other option is to expand to new areas in Jharia or even outside. Here the greatest difficulty is in acquiring land. Even for the land acquired earlier, ‘jobs for land’ struggle is still going on in Jharia. Today no one is prepared to give land, there is no guarantee of job nor is any land available for resettlement.

The only possible partial solution is limited mechanization in some mines. All mines are not making losses. A comparison between profit making and loss making mines will give some space for reorganization and viability. When there is no money to buy picks and shovels, where would money for this come from?

Privatisation

That is of course the current mantra for all problems. However the main reason for nationalization, namely, lack of capital in the private sector still exists. No one in the area believes that private sector will sink capital in this scenario. Also, all sections of workers and particularly the officer class which is living on the loot are opposed to it. As far as private sector in new areas is concerned, the problem of land acquisition remains.

Union Response

The workers and unions are firmly opposed to private sector, VRS and retrenchment. They do not even talk of redundancy among officers class. But they demand that officers should actually work and get back to the half pant culture! They want the theft/loot by the officer class to stop, which they estimate is of the order of Rs 1000 crore and that this alone will cover the losses. They would like the govt. to have a pro-worker attitude, increase the manpower at the mine loader level, plan mine by mine concretely, and take the workers and union in confidence and so on. It is only wishfuly thinking.

Another equally wishful thinking is worker’s take over of the mines and running them. It appears attractive but has lot of problems. Deep underground mines are difficult to take over because of the technology involved and safety factors. Easy mines are already over exploited and are well on their way of being exhausted. Mining is a hazardous industry and will become more unsafe. Illegal mines in Gridih are good example. Many closed mines are already being run by workers illegally and lot of accidents occurs. While it is possible to choose a few mines and run them, as a solution to the industry it is a non-starter. And even then the union is hardly prepared for it and is unaware of the kind of actual problems it will face.

Mines, Minerals & People

MM & P is an alliance of individuals, institutions and communities who are concerned and affected by mines. MM& P takes a wider perspective. It holds that the destruction of pre-existing habitat for the mining industry undermines the possibility of any other use of the resources of the area. It has also social and political implications when it is in the most forested region and traditionally inhabited by Dalits and Indigenous Peoples. It holds that mining should be the last resort for the use of land and that there is much greater wealth for humankind above these minerals. They advocate minimum mining and replacement of non renewable with more renewable sources [MM&P, 2001].

While MM& P itself is not a large force they form a part of debate on development issue, which is growing in energy and has a large mass support. Development for whom? Who benefits from coal mines, power and iron & steel and cement? In Jharkhand this is a powerful movement which has tasted victory in Koel Karo Dam project and forests of west Singhbhum district. In Hazaribag where Australians are trying to acquire land for new coal mines, there is a powerful opposition. So the views and interests of bystander population are not only significant but decisive.

Concluding Remarks

It is a depressing scenario. Jharia-Dhanbad coalfield is no longer a destination for capital. The future is in closing down these mines - at least that is what the best alternative is in the near future. Some 15% of profit making mines will survive. From the workers’ point of view it is a losing battle which has to be fought because livelihood anywhere in any condition remains important and cannot be given up. Some form of struggle has to be taken up to wind up this mess. A million people are dependent on it and huge land mass is involved. You can’t drop a bomb and start in a new area. The people have to fight and demand their rights from the state which is responsible for this.

Having said that, the situation in a long term sense is not necessarily depressing. A flight of capital does not leave an area destitute. As experience shows, it is the coming in of capital that brought destitution of the local population in Jharkhand. Less negative is positive. Left to themselves people can manage for themselves quite well.

Postscript

This article was written in 2002. Much has happened since then.

1. Due to heavy demand from China for the olympic games, demand for steel and coal have gone up and BCCL is no longer a loss making company. In fact it is making good profits now.

2. No major change has occurred in functioning of the BCKU. No major change in leadership either. A K Roy is still the official head but in day to day work he has hardly any  role.

 3.  The concept coal mine (new or old ) has changed. There is no coal mines any more. Now it is coal bearing areas which has already been earmarked as area I, area II etc. Now there are new or old projects. the exact number of which is not known to me

4. The most important development is the resistance against notice of eviction to people of Jharia due to under ground fire. There is also one case of resistance against a new project  This is in the township of Bhuli where retired employees of BCCL and their relatives who are still occupying the quarter illegally as well as some small traders who are unauthorized occupants of BCCL land are refusing to vacate the land earmarked for starting an open cast project. They are getting support from political parties of all hue.

References   

AICFAIP (All India Coordinating Forum of the Adivasis/Indigenous peoples)

2001: Voices of the Adivasi/Indigenous People of India.

Brown, L R (2002): Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the Earth.

Das, Anjana & Jyothi Parikh (2002): “Coal, Oil and Gas” in India Development Report, 1999-2002. Ed. Kirit S. Shah.

Standing Committee on Energy (2002): Dept. of Coal, Thirteenth Lok Sabha Secretariat.

Martin, Max (2002): “Black Burden” The New Indian Express, July 15.

Mines, Minerals & People (2001): Brochure

Mukherjee, Uttam & Ashok Kumar (2002): Awaj, July 5.

Roy, A K (2002): “Coal. Is Privatisation an Answer”, Frontier Feb, 3-9

Roy, A K (2002a): “Is Privatisation a Solution of the Crisis of the Coal Industry? Workers’ Answer is: No”, Dhanbad, BCKU (CITU), Pamphlet in Hindi.

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Published in Frontier, April 6-13, 2003, Kolkata.